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INTRODUCTION 
 The daily work of representatives of labor and management is carried out 
against the often shifting background of legal decisions and legislation. Decisions by 
state and federal courts, labor boards, arbitrators, and administrative agencies, as well 
as the deliberations of elected officials, shape the world of labor relations by providing 
a set of ground rules under which the parties operate.  
 These decisions may affect the scope of collective bargaining, the rights and 
responsibilities of union organizers, the relationship between state and federal law,  
and the expanding panoply of individual employee rights.   
 In compiling this year’s legal update, we look especially at recent decisions 
from the National Labor Relations Board, issues of federal preemption and same sex 
marriage cases. 
 
 
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND RELATED CASES 
A. The Bush Board   
  
The National Labor Relations Board remained stable over the past year in terms 
of Board members and is currently at full strength. The full Board still holds a 
Republican majority and the current members with their party affiliation and term 
expiration dates are: 
  
Peter Schaumber (R) Confirmed for second term that will expire on 
August 27, 2010 
Wilma Liebman (D) Reappointed to a third term this past year. Term 
expires August 27, 2011 
 Robert Battista (Chair) (R) Term expires 12-16-07 
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Dennis Walsh (D)         Recess appointment, to extend through 2007 and       
nominated to complete term set to end on 12-16-09. 
Peter N. Kirsanow (R) Recess appointment, to extend through 2007 and   
nominated to complete term set to end on 8-27-08 
 
 B. Unit Cases 
 
 In Point Park University v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir, 2006), the Court 
remanded a case to the Board because neither the Regional Director nor the Board 
followed the Court’s guidance on the question of managerial status1, nor did they 
adequately explain why the faculty’s role at the University was not managerial in nature. 
While the Court was prepared to be “deferential” to the Board on the issue of managerial 
status, “we cannot be deferential, however, where the Board fails to adequately explain 
its reasoning.”  In this case, the Board did not explain its reasoning to the satisfaction of 
the Court.  While both the Regional Director and the Board filled up many pages of 
factual findings and referred to many Yeshiva elements, they did not explain “which 
factors are significant and which less so, and why” in their determination that the faculty 
at Point Park were not managerial. The closest the Regional Director came was a 
conclusory statement that Point Park’s “faculty… undoubtedly has an important 
consultative role but based on the record developed, it cannot be concluded that they 
exercised such plenary, absolute or effective authority or control to warrant their 
exclusion from the protection of the Act as managers.” The Court found this an 
inadequate substitute for “fact-specific analysis called for by Yeshiva and Lemoyne-
Owens.” 
 
In Columbia College and Illinois Education Association (IEA), 346 NLRB No. 69 
(2006), the Illinois Education Association (IEA) represented a unit of Columbia 
College’s part-time faculty, and sought to represent a unit of full-time and regular part-
time staff employees working in 72 different academic and administrative departments at 
the private University.  The Board conducted an election pursuant to the parties’ 
Stipulated Election Agreement.  Of the approximately 422 eligible voters, 138 cast 
ballots in favor of the Union and 158 cast ballots against representation.  In addition, 
there were sixty challenged ballots, a number sufficient to affect the results of the 
election.  Much of the dispute revolved around the votes and representation of 
approximately twenty-four non-student tutors in the English department’s writing center 
and approximately twelve non-student tutors in the math and science department’s 
learning center.  Eleven writing center tutors and five learning center tutors voted in the 
election but were challenged because their names did not appear on the Excelsior list. 
 
All of the math and science departments’ learning center tutors and most of the 
English department’s writing center tutors held part-time faculty positions in their 
respective departments in addition to their tutoring jobs.  All of the tutors work a part-
time schedule in their respective centers and are hired on a semester-by-semester basis 
and as a matter of practice have been rehired for each following semester if they wish to 
continue tutoring.  Writing center tutors are supervised by a non-faculty staff supervisor, 
                                                 
1 As expressed in the Court’s decision in Lemoyne-Owen College v. NLRB, 357 F. 3d 55 (D.C. Cir., 2004). 
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while the learning center tutors are supervised by a part-time faculty member who also 
holds a tutoring position.  Employees in both centers apply separately to work as tutors, 
and their tutoring work is not a requirement of their part-time faculty positions.  Tutors 
work regularly scheduled hours in their respective centers and receive two separate 
paychecks, one for teaching and one for tutoring; however, tutoring work is compensated 
at a much lower rate than teaching.  Tutors in the learning center may occasionally see 
students from their classes during their tutoring hours while tutors in the writing center do 
not tutor their own students. 
 
Columbia filed objections with the NLRB arguing that all of the challenged voters 
were ineligible based on three factors: (1) the individuals were ineligible tutors, (2) the 
employees were either managerial or supervisors, and (3) the employees were ineligible 
for various specific reasons.  Columbia argued that the tutors were not eligible to vote 
because they were excluded from the unit under the “faculty” and “independently 
contracted tutors” exclusions or because they were dual-function employees covered by a 
current collective-bargaining agreement and they did not spend at least 50 percent of their 
time performing tutoring work.   
 
The hearing officer recommended that 42 of the 60 ballot challenges be overruled 
and recommended sustaining an objection which alleged that the Employer failed to 
supply a complete Excelsior list.  The hearing officer recommended, in part, that the 
challenges to the tutors’ ballots be overruled because the tutors did not fall within the 
Stipulated Election Agreement’s exclusion of “independently contracted tutors” from the 
unit.  In so finding, the hearing officer applied the Board’s independent contractor test 
and determined that the learning center and writing center tutors were not independent 
contractors within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, but rather were statutory 
employees of the college, and had a community of interest with the other staff employees 
based on similar job functions, wage rates, lack of benefits, and a lack of evidence in the 
record that the tutors do not have a community of interest with the other staff employees.  
In addition, the hearing officer found that part-time faculty members holding part-time 
tutoring positions were not dual-function employees because they had separate and 
distinct employment relationships for each position.  He concluded that, as tutors, they 
had a community of interest only with the part-time staff employees.  However, to the 
extent that these tutors were considered to be dual-function employees, the hearing 
officer found that they had a sufficient community of interest with the other staff 
employees to permit their inclusion in the unit. 
 
The National Labor Relations Board agreed with the hearing officer’s 
recommendation to overrule Columbia’s challenges to the ballots and that the Employer 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that these employees were either excluded 
supervisors or ineligible managerial employees.  Further, the Board agreed with the 
hearing officer that the “independently contracted tutors” exclusion did not apply to the 
challenged tutors and that the “faculty” exclusion did not apply to individuals holding 
both a faculty position and an included position.  In adopting the hearing officer’s 
recommendation, the Board noted that the hearing officer’s analysis was consistent with 
Caesar’s Tahoe, 337 NLRB 1096, 1097 (2002).  In applying the Caesar’s Tahoe test, the 
4
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Board opined that the term “independently contracted tutors” was open to differing 
reasonable interpretations, which could not be resolved by reference to the language of 
the stipulated election agreement alone.  The Board therefore looked to the second prong 
of Caesar’s Tahoe to infer that the parties intended to give the words “independently 
contracted” the meaning used by the Board and the courts in related contexts.  The Board 
stated that under general principles of contract interpretation, technical terms and words 
of art are given their technical meaning unless the context or usage which is applicable 
indicates a different meaning.  The Board determined that the hearing officer correctly 
found that the parties intended to exclude those who met the test for independent-
contractor status, as defined by both the Board and the courts because the record 
contained no evidence that the parties intended the term “independently contracted” to be 
given anything other than its technical meaning.   
 
The Board next found that the Stipulated Election Agreement’s exclusion of 
“faculty” was also ambiguous and therefore looked for other evidence of the parties’ 
intentions, as required by Caesar’s Tahoe.  Because the record contained no evidence of 
the parties’ intent in crafting the exclusion, general principles of contract interpretation 
did not resolve the issue, and there was nothing in law which would suggest than an 
employee who holds two positions, one included in a stipulated unit and one excluded 
from that unit, must as a matter of law be excluded from the unit, the Board looked to the 
community-of-interest test.  In doing so, the Board found that employees holding both an 
otherwise eligible staff position and a part-time faculty position were properly included in 
the unit, despite some differences between the dual-function employees and most staff 
employees.  The Board found a similar community of interest because these employees, 
when working their non-faculty positions, were paid hourly wages comparable to other 
staff employees, like other staff received no benefits, worked specific and limited 
schedules like other staff employees, worked under separate supervision from faculty, 
and performed non-classroom teaching functions.   
 
The Board noted that an employee with job responsibilities encompassing more 
than one position is generally considered a dual-function employee.  According to the 
Board, the touchstone of dual-function employee status is the fact that a single employee 
performs multiple job functions covered by one or more of the employer’s job 
classifications.  Here, the Board stated that the tutors who also held part-time faculty 
positions fell squarely within the scope of the Board’s traditional definition of dual-
function employees.  The Board then concluded that the dual-function employees were 
eligible to vote in the stipulated unit, as determined by a variant of the Board’s traditional 
community-of-interest test.  The Board noted that it has long held that employees who 
perform more than one function for the same employer may vote, even though they spend 
less than a majority of their time on unit work, if they regularly perform duties similar to 
those performed by unit members for sufficient periods of time to demonstrate that they 
have a substantial interest in working conditions in the unit.  The Board agreed with the 
hearing officer’s determination that the dual-function tutors had a community of interest 
with the employees in the stipulated unit.  Further, Columbia, as the party seeking to 
exclude the tutors, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the tutors did not 
have a community of interest with the staff unit.   
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The Board further determined that the stipulated bargaining unit did not include 
any classifications covered by the existing part-time faculty collective-bargaining 
agreement.  To the contrary, the stipulated bargaining unit excluded faculty positions 
which were covered by that agreement.  The dual-function tutors’ job duties as part-time 
faculty were separate and independent from their duties as tutors.  Instead of holding a 
single, integrated job with responsibilities spanning multiple classifications and 
potentially multiple collective-bargaining agreements, their duties as faculty and as tutors 
were contained within their separate and independent positions.  Accordingly, the part-
time faculty collective-bargaining agreement did not bar the inclusion of part-time faculty 
employees holding part-time tutoring positions in the petitioned-for staff unit. 
 
 In Pace University, 349 NLRB 10 (2007), the Board found that the University 
committed an unfair labor practice by not bargaining with the certified union over certain 
disputed adjunct faculty members.  In 2004, the AFT was certified as the representative 
of a unit of “all adjunct faculty members, part-time instructors, and all adjunct faculty 
members and part-time instructors who work in a non-supervisory dual capacity for the 
Employer,” excluding, inter alia, “casual employees.” In setting up the election, the 
Regional Director set forth the following voter eligibility criteria: “Eligible to vote in the 
election are those in this unit who have received appointments and teach or have taught at 
least 3 credit hours and/or 45 hours in any semester in any of two academic year during 
the three year period commencing with the 2001-02 academic year and ending with the 
2003-04 academic year.”  
 
 When bargaining began, a dispute arose between the University and the Union 
over the inclusion in the unit of some adjuncts. The University contended that only those 
who met the voter eligibility guidelines should be recognized as unit members. The 
University contended that an adjunct faculty member does not become a unit member 
until he or she has taught three credits and/or 45 hours in a semester in two of the three 
preceding three academic years, including the current year. The Union contended that any 
faculty member who taught three credits and/or 45 hours in one semester should be in the 
unit. After a unit clarification petition was filed, the Regional Director agreed with the 
union. The University continued to refuse to bargain over such adjuncts and, hence, the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Board found the University in violation of Section 8 
(a)(1) and (5). 
 
 
  C. Work Place Rules 
 
 As discussed in previous years at this conference, an important area of recent 
Board decisions has been the tension between the employer’s right to issue work place 
rules of conduct and the employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity under 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.  
 
 By way of brief background, in 2004, the Board had issued a major decision in 
this area. In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB No.75, 176 LRRM 1044 
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(2004), by a 3-2 vote, the Board held that work rules prohibiting abusive and  profane 
language, harassment and verbal, mental and physical abuse were lawful ways of 
maintaining order in the workplace and did not chill protected concerted activity by 
employees. 
 
 The core of the Board’s decision is set forth at the beginning of the decision. 
 
The Board has held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a 
work rule that reasonably tends to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 
7 rights. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998).  In determining 
whether a challenged rule is unlawful, the Board must, however, give the rule a 
reasonable reading. It must refrain from reading particular phrases in isolation, 
and it must not presume improper interference with employee rights. Id. at 825, 
827.  Consistent with the foregoing, our inquiry into whether the maintenance of a 
challenged rule is unlawful begins with the issue of whether the rule explicitly 
restricts activities protected by Section 7.  If it does, we will find the rule 
unlawful. If the rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Section 7, the 
violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: (1) employees 
would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule 
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to 
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.   
 
Since 2004, other decisions have dealt with work place rules in light of this case. 
Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 97 (2005); Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, 414 F. 3d 1249 
(10th Cir, 2005).  
  
 In February of this year, the aforementioned Guardsmark case came up for review 
before the D.C. Circuit. In the decision below, the Board had held that two workplace 
rules – one requiring that employees register their complaints only through the chain of 
command and the other barring solicitation – violated the NLRA. The Board found that a 
third rule barring “fraternization” was lawful because the Board thought employees 
would not reasonably interpret it to interfere with protected activities. The union (SEIU, 
Local 24/7) challenged this ruling, and the company challenged the ruling on the other 
two rules. The Court upheld the Board ruling that the chain of command rule and the 
solicitation rule were illegal, and, in addition, it agreed with the union that this 
fraternization rule was also illegal. Guardsmark, LLC v. NLRB,  2007 WL 283455 (DC 
Cir., 2007). 
 
 Guardsmark is a company providing security guard services to clients. The 
fraternization rule in question stated that “while on duty, you must NOT …. fraternize on 
duty or off duty, date or become friendly with the client’s employees or with co 
employees. The Board had found that nothing in this rule ran afoul of the Act. Observing 
that the rule lists “fraternize” next to two terms referring to romantic relationships among 
employees – “date” and “become overly friendly” – the Board concluded that “employees 
would reasonably understand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements rather than 
activity protected by the Act.” 
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 The Court did not think that the “neighborhood” approach on words that the 
Board used held any water. The Court said that a reasonable employee would look at the 
rule and believe that the word “fraternize” held some independent meaning other than 
“dating” or “becoming overly friendly.” Quoting Merriam Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary, 10th edition, the Court noted that “fraternize” is defined as meaning “to 
associate or mingle as brothers or on fraternal terms.” It found similar definitions in five 
other dictionaries and ultimately concluded that “employees would reasonably interpret 
the rule to prevent them from discussing terms and conditions of employment. In other 
words, we find unreasonable the Board’s conclusion that employees would understand 
the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements rather than activity protected by the 
Act.” 
 
D. Definition of “Supervisor” under the NLRA 
 
The NLRA excludes supervisors from its coverage. Section 2 (11) of the Act defines 
a supervisor as: 
(11) The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest 
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, 
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to 
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection 
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 
This definition has been a source of hundreds of cases over the years as the Board 
sorts out representation questions. 
 
Certainly one of the lead decisions from the past year from the Board was Oakwood 
Health Care, Inc. 348 NLRB No. 37 (Sept. 29, 2006). This decision represents the 
Board’s latest thinking on how supervisory status should be interpreted for professional 
employees. In question was the status of certain charge nurses and whether or not they 
should be included in a unit of all registered nurses at Oakwood Heritage Hospital in 
Taylor, Michigan.   
 
The Board handled this case following a consideration of amicus briefs from many 
parties on both sides of the issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. 
Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001). In Kentucky River, the Court had 
taken issue with the Board’s interpretation of the term “independent judgment” to 
exclude the exercise of “ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less 
skilled employees to deliver services.” The Board’s view had been that, even if a Section 
2(11) function is exercised with a substantial degree of discretion, there is no 
“independent judgment” if the judgment was of a particular kind, namely “ordinary 
professional or technical judgment.” The Court found this to be clear error, and noted that 
it is the degree of discretion involved in making the decision, not the kind of discretion 
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exercised –whether professional, technical or otherwise – that determines the existence of 
“independent judgment” under section 2 (11) of the Act.   
 
In addressing this basic question of what constitutes “independent judgment,” the 
Board first noted that a judgment is not “independent” if it is “dictated or controlled by 
detailed instructions, whether set forth in company policies or rules, the verbal 
instructions of a higher authority or in the provisions of collective bargaining 
agreements.” The Board said, for example, a decision to staff a shift with a certain 
number of nurses would not involve independent judgment if it is determined by a fixed 
nurse-patient ratio requirement. Nor would independent judgment be involved if a person 
were merely following strict seniority rules in assigning work. 
 
The Board also noted that not all professional judgments are supervisory. Thus, a 
charge nurse who makes a professional judgment that a particular patient requires 
monitoring does not become a supervisor unless he or she assigns an employee to that 
patient or responsibly directs that employee in carrying out the monitoring function. 
 
The Board explained that when an individual is engaged a part of the time as a 
supervisor, and the rest of the time as a unit employee, the legal standard for a 
supervisory determination is “whether the individual spends a regular and substantial 
portion of his/her work time performing supervisory functions. While the Board did not 
adopt a strict numerical definition of substantiality, it did note that it has found 
supervisory status “where individuals have served in a supervisory role for at least 10-15 
percent of their total work time.”  
  
On the specific aspects of supervisory status, the Board discussed the question of 
whether the charge nurses had authority in the area of work assignments. On the general 
question of what constitutes “assign,” the Board stated that “the ordinary meaning of the 
term “assign” is “to appoint to a post or duty.” It went on to say: 
 
We construe the term ‘assign’ to refer to the act of designating an employee to a 
place (such as a location, department, or wing); appointing an employee to a time 
(such as a shift or overtime period); or giving significant overall duties, i.e. tasks, 
to an employee. 
 
Second, the Board stated that the statutory phrase of “responsibly to direct” meant 
direction that involved accountability. Thus, either the employee giving direction could 
hold the employee given direction accountable for not complying (e.g. corrective action), 
or that the employee giving direction could be held accountable by a higher authority for 
the direction given. 
 
Using this guidance, the Board found that the permanent (as opposed to rotating) 
charge nurses “assign” nursing personnel to patients. At the beginning of each shift, and 
as patients are admitted thereafter, the charge nurse assigns the staff working the unit to 
the patients they will then care for. The charge nurses’ assignments determine what will 
9
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be the required work for an employee during the shift, thereby having a material effect on 
the employee’s terms and conditions of employment.  
 
The Board noted that this assignment authority was also exercised with the use of 
independent judgment. The charge nurses make their assignments by choosing among the 
staff available. In the health care context, choosing among available staff frequently 
requires independent judgment and discretion. 
 
Matching a nurse with a patient may have life and death consequences. Nurses are 
professionals, not widgets, and may possess different levels of training and 
specialized skills. Similarly, patients are not identical and may require highly 
particularized care.  A charge nurse’s analysis of an available nurse’s skill set and 
level of proficiency at performing certain tasks and her application of that analysis 
in matching that nurse to the condition and needs of a particular patient, involves 
a degree of discretion markedly different than the assignment decisions exercised 
by most leadmen. 
 
Based on this, the Board found that the charge nurses must exercise a substantial 
degree of discretion sufficient to constitute independent judgment and make them 
supervisors under the Act. By contrast, charge nurses in the emergency room did not 
meet this level of discretion and were instead included in the unit since they did not make 
particular assignments of staff to patients and did not take into account patient acuity or 
nursing skills in making geographic assignments within the ER.  
 
While the Board did not believe its decision represented a “sea change” in 
interpreting the Act, the dissent of Members Liebman and Walsh disagreed, claiming that 
the Board had in effect excluded thousands of professional employees from 
representation rights. The dissent took issue with what it believed to be a broad reading of 
“assign” in the majority’s decision. The dissent would not have read the term “assign” to 
include task assignments, but only on the issues of determining an employee’s position 
with the employer; designated work site; or designated work hours. In short, “it must be 
the employees who are assigned not the tasks.” From the dissent’s point of view, the 
assignment of tasks fits better under the question of whether the individual “responsibly 
directs” the employee.  
 
On this latter question of what it means to “responsibly to direct,” the dissent 
argued for a more limited definition, contending that it only occurs when 1) the person 
has been delegated substantial authority to ensure that a work unit achieves 
management’s objectives and is thus “in charge” 2) is held accountable for the work of 
others; and 3) exercises significant discretion and judgment in directing his or her work 
unit.  In essence, the dissent argued that the majority’s ruling encompasses “workers who 
have neither the genuine prerogatives of management, nor the statutory rights of ordinary 
employees.” 
 
10
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Efforts were afoot in Congress this Spring to develop guidelines to determine the 
supervisory status of charge nurses in an effort to blunt or reverse the impact of the 
Oakwood decision. (See Daily Labor Report, BNA, 3/23/07). 
 
E. Supervisors’ Support for a Union 
 
In 2004, the Board had issued a significant decision in Harborside Healthcare 
Inc., 343 NLRB No. 100, 176 LRRM 1113 (2004), where the Board held in a 3-2 
decision that the pro-union activities of a nursing home charge nurse who later was 
found to be a supervisor amounted to objectionable conduct that interfered with the 
holding of a fair representation election. 
 
In that case, the Board set forth in detail the criteria it would use to decide 
whether or not a supervisor’s pro-union activity would be sufficient to overturn an 
election. 
 
[W]e take this opportunity to restate the legal standard to be applied in cases 
involving objections to an election based on supervisory prounion conduct. 
 
When asking whether supervisory pro-union conduct upsets the requisite 
laboratory conditions for a fair election, the Board looks to two factors. 
  
(1) Whether the supervisor’s prounion conduct reasonably tended to coerce or 
interfere with the employees’ exercise of free choice in the election.   
This inquiry includes:  (a) consideration of the nature and degree of 
supervisory authority possessed by those who engage in the prounion 
conduct; and (b) an examination of the nature, extent, and context of the 
conduct in question.   
 
(2) Whether the conduct interfered with freedom of choice to the extent that it 
materially affected the outcome of the election, based on factors such as (a) 
the margin of victory in the election; (b) whether the conduct at issue was 
widespread or isolated; (c) the timing of the conduct; (d) the extent to which 
the conduct became known; and (e) the lingering effect of the conduct. 
  
 
In SNE Enterprises, Inc. 348 NLRB 69 (2006), the Board found that leadperson’s 
role in soliciting authorization cards constituted objectionable conduct that warranted 
setting aside the election.  In this case, several leadpersons, each of whom supervised 
about 20 employees, directly solicited cards from some of their subordinates during a 
union drive at their window and door manufacturing plant. After the petition for an 
election was filed, three of the leadpersons continued to publicly support the Union, 
telling employees that the union would help them get better benefits and treatment from 
the employer, and that the union would secure just cause protection for them. 
  
11
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In setting aside the election, the Board followed the Harborside guidelines. The 
Regional Director below had not found objectionable conduct under Harborside, noting 
that: the leads had a lack of power to significantly affect the employees’ working 
conditions; the employees did not perceive the leads as supervisors; in prior elections, 
leads had been eligible to vote; the employer specifically campaigned against the union. 
  
But the Board did not believe this avoided a finding of coercion.  The Board noted 
that collectively these leadpersons purposely targeted the vast majority of their 
subordinates. While these supervisors did not have any power of hiring and firing, they 
had the clear authority to assign and direct work and as such can impact broadly on their 
subordinates’ work life.  The leads campaigned here for an extensive period, well after 
the cards were filed, but even if solicitation of cards ceased after the petition was filed, 
such evidence, without more, is insufficient to negate the inherent coerciveness of the 
original solicitations. Employees who sign such cards may reasonably feel obligated to 
carry through on their stated intention to support the union, and the number of signed 
cards may paint a false portrait of employee support for the union.    
 
While the employer did conduct an anti union campaign, the employer never 
disavowed specifically the actions of the leads in soliciting employees. Further, the fact 
that the leads were not deemed supervisors in prior elections is irrelevant to this case.  
 
Finally, as to the impact of this conduct on the election, the election turned out to be 
very close, with the union winning 87-82 with three challenged ballots. More than 35 
employees had been solicited by the leads. Further, the impact of their solicitation was 
not isolated to the 35 employees; it was widely known among the employees that some of 
the leads were active members of the union organizing committee.  The lingering effect 
of their solicitation carried forth to election day. 
 
F.  Other Election Conduct 
 
 In S.T.A.R., Inc. Lighting the Way, 347 NLRB 008 (2006), the Board ordered that 
an election won by District 1199, SEIU at a health care facility be set aside. During the 
campaign, a union organizer gave a brochure to an employee that said, inter alia, “there 
is a one time $50 initiation fee. Workers who organize to join 1199 are exempt, and begin 
paying dues once a contract is won.”  This left the impression that initiation fees would 
be waived only for those who supported the union before the election. At a later meeting 
with employees prior to the election, an organizer explained that there would be no 
initiation fee for anyone working at the facility before the union obtains a contract.  
 
 In analyzing this case, the Board noted that a union interferes with free choice 
when it offers to waive initiation fees for only those employees who manifest support for 
the union before an election.  NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973).  When a 
union makes an ambiguous offer to waive fees, it is the union’s duty to clarify that 
ambiguity or suffer the consequences that might attach to employees’ possible 
interpretations of the ambiguity.  Inland Shoe Mfg. Co, 211 NLRB 724 (1974). 
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 In the hearing officer’s view, the union’s brochure in this case was certainly 
ambiguous and could have led employees to believe that only those active organizers and 
union supporters would have their initiation fee waived and that those who oppose the 
union or were neutral would not.  However, the hearing officer believed the union 
satisfied its obligation to clarify the ambiguity. The Board disagreed. 
  
 The Board noted that everyone received the ambiguous brochure, either directly 
from union organizers or from the employer, who put the last page of the brochure in 
everyone’s mailbox.  However, the union never articulated its nonobjectionable waiver 
policy to those 136 eligible voters. Only 18 members attended the union meeting where 
the policy was explained.  
 
 The dissenting member of the Board in this case (Liebman) tried to argue that the 
employer should not benefit from the fact that it was the employer who placed the 
brochure in the boxes of all employees, thereby making sure that all employees were 
aware of the ambiguous statement. The union claimed it did not know about such 
dissemination. The Board majority, however, noted that the result should not depend on 
whether the party who engaged in the objectionable conduct knew about the 
dissemination of that conduct. The issue is not whether a party should be punished but 
rather whether the employees have been exposed to conduct that interfered with their free 
choice.  
 
Thus, the critical facts in this case are that the Petitioner’s brochure contained an 
objectionable statement, that the statement was distributed to 136 employees, and 
that the Petitioner did not, as required by Board precedent, clarify its policy for 
most of these employees.  The fact that the Petitioner was unaware of the 
distribution and so arguably saw no need to clarify its policy is beside the point. 
The point is that the Petitioner’s ambiguous fee-waiver statement reasonably 
tended to coerce a determinative number of employees in their election choice. 
Consequently, and to avoid sanctioning a tainted election result, we take into 
consideration the fact that all of the employees were exposed to the objectionable 
statement. 
 
 
G. Use of E-Mail during Campaigns 
 
 In Media Gen. Operations Inc. d/b/a Richmond Times Dispatch v. NLRB, 4th Cir, 
No. 06-1023, unpublished opinion, 3/15/07, reported in DLR, 3/30/07, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals enforced a Board order against a newspaper company that barred 
employees from using the corporate email system to discuss union matters but did not bar 
the use of the system for other nonbusiness use.  While the company did have a policy of 
barring all personal use of email, this policy was not enforced, and many employees 
routinely used the system for messages relating to charities, social events and personal 
matters without being disciplined.  However, the policy was enforced selectively against 
those employees who sent emails dealing with union solicitation.  
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In a most important case for future organizing campaigns, on March 27, 2007, the 
question of whether employees have any right to use their employers’ email systems to 
communicate with one another about unionization and related matters was argued orally 
before the NLRB in the case of Guard Publishing Company, d/b/a The Register-Guard, 
NLRB No. 36-CA-8743-1, as reported in Daily Labor Report, 3/28/07, BNA.  The case 
arose when the company issued a memo indicating that the email system –along with its 
telephones, copying machines, fax machines and message machines – were not to be used 
for solicitation of any kind. When some employees used the email system for union-
related matters, they were disciplined and charges ensued. The Administrative Law Judge 
for the NLRB had found that, since the company allowed the email to be used for 
personal matters, it was discriminating against employees who sent union-related emails.  
 
The NLRB General Counsel urged the full Board to balance employees’ rights under 
Section 7 with employers’ business interests in regulating the use of emails and to 
accommodate both interests as much as possible. The General Counsel urged that any 
policy banning all nonbusiness e-mail use should be deemed presumptively illegal absent 
some showing of special circumstances. During the oral argument, one of the Board 
members noted that employers frequently monitor their email systems to prevent 
computer viruses and liability for illegal conduct and asked the General Counsel if such 
employers could be charged with illegal surveillance of employees’ union activity. The 
General Counsel agreed that employers have that right to monitor email and that 
employees should have no expectation of privacy in email communication.   
 
The union argued that the Board should hold that whenever an employer allows its 
email to be used for nonbusiness use, it must allow employees to use the email system to 
communicate about unions or other concerted activity. The union did acknowledge that 
employers may restrict such email communications to nonworking time. Union counsel 
was asked by one of the Board members about union email communications to 
employees, and he responded that it would be illegal discrimination for an employer to 
block emails from the union.  
 
On the other hand, the company argued that the email system is the company’s 
equipment and private property and that the company has the right to regulate and restrict 
its use and that there is no section 7 right to use it for non business purposes. The email 
system is private property and subject to legal prohibitions on trespass.  Counsel for the 
company was asked whether an employee who sent an email complaining about wages to 
other employees would be in violation of the policy. He responded that that would not 
violate the policy because it would not be on behalf of an outside organization; it would 
not be solicitation. But if an email expressed an interest in getting a union, that becomes 
an email that is made on behalf of an outside organization and would be solicitation.  
 
 Hopefully, the various issues that the Board will examine in this case include:  
 
1. Do employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system (or other 
computer-based communication systems) to communicate with other employees 
about union or other concerted, protected matters?  If so, what restrictions, if any, 
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may an employer place on those communications? If not, does an employer 
nevertheless violate the Act if it permits non-job-related e-mails but not those 
related to union or other concerted, protected matters?;  
 
2. Should the Board apply traditional rules regarding solicitation and/or distribution 
to employees’ use of their employer’s e-mail system?  If so, how should those 
rules be applied?  If not, what standard should be applied?  
 
3. If employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system, may an employer 
nevertheless prohibit e-mail access to its employees by non-employees?  If 
employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system, to what extent may 
an employer monitor that use to prevent unauthorized use?  
 
4. In answering the foregoing questions, of what relevance is the employee’s 
workplace?  For example, should the Board take account of whether the employee 
works at home or at some location other than a facility maintained by the 
employer?;  
 
5. Is employees’ use of their employer’s e-mail system a mandatory subject of 
bargaining?  Assuming that employees have a Section 7 right to use their 
employer’s e-mail system, to what extent is that right waivable by their 
bargaining representative?;  
 
6. How common are employer policies regulating the use of employer e-mail 
systems?  What are the most common provisions of such policies?  Have any such 
policies been agreed to in collective bargaining?  If so, what are their most 
significant provisions and what, if any, problems have arisen under them?  
 
7. Are there any technological issues concerning e-mail or other computer-based 
communication systems that the Board should consider in answering the 
foregoing questions? 
 
H. Preemption 
 
 Since the time of our founding fathers, the fundamental tension in our 
constitutional system resides in the relative power and authority of the federal 
government and state governments. In the legal world, this issue often arises under the 
heading of preemption – the principle that in some regulated areas of society Congress 
through its legislative authority has preempted the field, and states cannot pass legislation 
that does violence to that federal oversight. 
 
 In the past year, preemption cases continued to arise in the labor law sector. One 
case deserving of some attention is Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v Lockyear, 437 
F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2006).  This case had actually been heard before by the Court in 2005. 
In Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyear, 2005 U.S. App LEXIS 19208, 422 
F.3d 973, (9th Cir, September, 2005), a three judge panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals 
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for the Ninth Circuit had originally found that a California state law which prohibited 
employers receiving more than $10,000 in state funds from using any of those funds to 
“assist, promote or deter union organizing” interfered with an employer’s right to free 
speech under Section 8 (c) of the NLRA and was thus preempted by that Act. The Court 
wrote:  
Although cast nominally as an effort to ensure state neutrality, the California 
statute, by discouraging employers from exercising their protected speech rights, 
operates to significantly empower labor unions as against employers. In doing so, 
the California statute runs roughshod over the delicate balance between labor 
unions and employers as mandated by Congress through the National Labor 
Relations Act. 
The statute in question (A.B.1889) established a state policy “not to interfere with an 
employee’s choice about whether to join or to be represented by a labor union”  by 
subsidizing either side of the argument.  Thus, the law prohibited all recipients of state 
grants and private employers that receive more than $10,000 annually in state funds from 
using “any of those funds to assist, promote or deter union organizing,” which was 
further defined as “any attempt by an employer to influence the decision of its employees 
in this state or those of its subcontractors regarding …. [w]hether to support or oppose a 
labor organization that represents or seeks to represent those employees… or [w]hether to 
become a member of any labor organization.”  An employer who qualified under this 
language could not use state funds for “any expense, including legal and consulting fees 
and salaries of supervisors and employees, incurred for research for, or preparation, 
planning or coordination of, or carrying out, an activity to assist, promote, or deter union 
organizing.”  The employers also would have been required to keep detailed records to 
show the funds have not been used for improper purposes. The law further created a 
presumption that if state and nonstate funds were commingled in any way, the state funds 
were used for an illegal purpose. 
 Violations of the law would not merely involved loss of state funds but included 
fines and treble damages and the employer could be sued by both the State and by private 
taxpayers.    
 In striking down the statute, the Court wrote: 
 
We conclude that the California statute, which is far from the neutral enactment 
that the state attorney general and the unions contend it to be, significantly 
undermines the speech rights of employers related to union organizing campaigns. 
Under the guise of preserving state neutrality with respect to labor relations, it 
directly conflicts with employers’ rights as granted by the Act. 
 
* * * * 
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By creating exacting compliance burdens, strict accounting requirements, the 
threat of lawsuits, and onerous penalties, the statute chills employer speech on the 
merits of unionism. 2 
But the 2005 decision by the three judge panel was not the final word, and it was 
withdrawn from publication. Instead, on January 17, 2006, the Court granted rehearing en 
banc in the case.  And on September 21, 2006, the Court ruled that the law did not 
undermine federal labor policy and was not preempted by the NLRA.  
In this case, the NLRB itself had filed an amicus brief urging preemption. The Board 
had argued that AB 1889 “works at cross purposes with such a policy [of employee free 
choice on the question of unionization] because it limits the flow of information to 
employees by regulating employer speech in an area – an organizational election – that 
Congress did intend to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.”   
But the Court disagreed, noting that AB 1889 does not prohibit an employer from 
using non-state funds to express its opinions; it only restricts state grant and program 
funds from being so used. The Court said that this case does not involve what is referred 
to as “Machinists’ preemption.”3  That type of preemption occurs when a state seeks to 
regulate an activity that, while not expressly protected or prohibited by the Act, is an 
activity that Congress nonetheless intended to be controlled solely by the “free play of 
economic forces.” Since the Court found that election conduct is indeed regulated by the 
NLRB itself, through its decisional law, then election conduct cannot fall into that 
unfettered zone where the free play of economic forces trumps all state action. Moreover, 
California did not condition receipt of state funds on employers’ declaration of neutrality 
in union campaigns. Employers can take any position they want under this law. They just 
cannot use the state funds to advance their purposes. Accordingly, the Court found that 
preemption based on the Machinists’ case is not applicable here. 
The Court also found that there was no Garmon preemption either. 4  In this type, 
there is an actual or potential conflict between state regulation and federal labor law due 
to state regulation of activity that is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the 
NLRA. Garmon thus protects NLRB jurisdiction over the conduct expressly protected or 
prohibited by the Act, while, by contrast, Machinists preemption concerns conduct that 
Congress left to laissez-fare. On this point, the Court again rejected arguments that the 
employers’ free speech rights, guaranteed by Section 8 (c) of the NLRA, and the First 
Amendment, have been infringed upon by AB 1889. That act did not limit employer free 
speech in any way.  
                                                 
2 This was actually the second time the Court had ruled on the legislation. In Chamber of Commerce v. 
Lockyer, 364 F. 3d 1154 (9th Cir., 2004), the Court had previously ruled that California’s “neutrality” 
legislation limited the free exchange of ideas and free speech during a union campaign and was inconsistent 
with national labor policy as delineated in the National Labor Relations Act. However, at that time, the 
AFL-CIO secured a reconsideration of the case and the 2004 opinion was withdrawn. 
3 So called based on the case of Machinists v., Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 
(1976) which delineated the principles. 
4 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
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The three members of the Court who disagreed noted that “once the state has chosen 
to award a contract to the lowest responsible bidder, the state’s interest in the funds it 
pays for the contracted goods and services is at an end…. Simply because a business 
chooses to contract with the state does not mean that the state may abrogate First 
Amendment rights…. Free market choice or not, these employers retain their First 
Amendment rights to spend their own funds, as the undoubtedly earn by contracting with 
the state, as they see fit.” 
Furthermore, the dissenters noted that the statute is clearly tilted in the unions’ favor; 
it is not as neutral as it appears. Rare is the employer that will use funds to encourage 
employees to unionize. Thus, by restricting the use of state funds, the state has taken a 
position in favor of unionization and has thus tilted the scales in an arena in which it did 
not belong. The statute strikes at the heart of employer free speech under section 8 (c )  
and should have been deemed preempted.  
In contrast to Lockyear, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York 
overturned a lower court ruling and held that a New York law restricting employers from 
using state money to encourage or discourage union organizing is preempted by the 
National Labor Relations Act. Healthcare Association of NY Stat, Inc. v. Pataki, (Case 
no. 05-2570, U.S. App. LEXIS 29857, December 5, 2006). That law, which had taken 
affect in December of 2002, provided that “no monies appropriated by the state for any 
purpose shall be used or made available to employers” for training managers regarding 
methods to encourage or discourage union activity or for participation in union drives; 
hiring attorneys, consultants, or contractors to engage in such activity; and paying 
employees whose principal job duties are to engage in such activities. The Court focused 
on section 8 (c) of the Act and noted that 8 (c) was meant to expand speech rights. 
Section 8 (c) “does protect employer speech in a unionization campaign context and can 
provide a basis for Garmon preemption.”   
While the Court also felt that Machinists’ preemption may be present as well, it stated 
that “the ultimate question depends on the same factors we considered relevant in our 
Garmon discussion: whether section 211-a burdens moneys that cannot properly be said 
to belong to the state (because they either belong to the contractors or to federal or local 
governments) and whether the State can accomplish its goal of saving money by limiting 
the kind of costs for which it will reimburse program participants. These questions in turn 
depend on disputed facts which cannot be decided on summary judgment.”  
Put another way, the court noted that “to the extent that section 211-a functions as a 
restriction on what use may be made of State grants, it is not preempted by Garmon.” 
However, “to the extent that section 211-a imposes restrictions on the association’s and 
their members use of proceeds earned from state contracts and statutory reimbursement 
obligations in which the contractor’s labor costs cannot affect the amount of expense to 
the State, it attempts to impose limitations on the use of the association’s money rather 
than the State’s; it therefore deters employers from the exercise of their rights under 
section 8 (c ) of the Act and satisfies the threshold conditions for Garmon preemption.”  
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Further, to the extent section 211-a might be interpreted to apply to funds that were 
originally appropriated by the federal government and only “pass through” the State en 
route to the contractors who earned the funds, it would exceed the State’s legitimate 
interest in controlling its own money.” For example, Medicare and Medicaid money 
might be said to simply pass through the state – and thus cannot be restricted by the State 
as to its use. However, the record was incomplete on this issue, and thus the court would 
not rule explicitly on this question. Ultimately, the case was thus remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Other preemption cases are of interest over the past year. One such significant case 
was Retail Industries Leaders Association v. Fielder, a case involving ERISA preemption 
rather than NLRA preemption. The law in question is Maryland’s Fair Share Health Care 
Fund Act, which requires very large employers to contribute a minimum percentage of 
wages for employee health care coverage or pay the difference to a public health care 
fund.  Only employers with 10,000 employees would be affected, and such employers 
would have to spend at least 6% of their payroll on health care costs, or else pay the 
difference into the state fund.  Out of all employers covered, only Wal-Mart does not 
meet this 6% threshold.  
On February 7, 2006, the Retail Industry Leaders Association challenged the law in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland claiming, among other arguments, 
that the law was preempted by ERISA. The statute was characterized in the lawsuit 
(Retail Industry Leaders Association, v. Fielder, Docket No. 06-316, D. Md.) as “an 
unlawful intrusion on the comprehensive federal framework for the administration and 
regulation of employee benefit plans” that Congress has laid out in ERISA.  
 
The defenders of the legislation argued that the law is not preempted because the state 
was seeking to regulate employers, not ERISA plans. The law would not require 
employers to set up ERISA plans, and only requires the employer to spend a certain 
amount of money on health care costs, and if they do not, they must contribute to a state 
fund. On the other state of the argument, opponents claimed that the statute “relates” to a 
benefit plan because the natural consequence of the legislation will be for companies to 
modify their plans.  
 
The District Court agreed that the law was preempted because the law effectively 
required employers to spend a minimum amount on health care benefit plans. It did not 
find that the act violated the Equal Protection Clause because the state’s classifications 
were not irrational.  Both sides appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 
  
On the preemption question, the Court observed first that ERISA did not mandate that 
employers establish specific benefit plans; it merely regulated such plans that an 
employer chooses to establish. The primary objective of ERISA was to “provide a 
uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans,” and to accomplish that, ERISA 
broadly preempts, by its own language, “any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. Section 1144(a).  
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In applying this concept to the Maryland Act, the Court noted that any “reasonable 
employer” would not pay the State a sum of money that it could instead spend on its 
employees’ healthcare. Thus, the “only rational choice employers have under the Fair 
Share Act is to structure their ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum 
spending threshold. The Act thus fall squarely under Shaw’s5  prohibition of state 
mandates on how employers’ structure their ERISA plans.” In the Court’s view, then, the 
Act clearly has an “obvious ‘connection with’ employee benefit plans and is so 
preempted by ERISA.  Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, _ F.3d _,  2007 
WL102157 (4TH Cir., 2007). 
In George v. AT & T Corp., (D. Mass, 2006), the federal district court in 
Massachusetts held that a former AT & T employee’s state law claim that the company 
had misrepresented to her that workforce reductions were going to take place, thus 
inducing her to retire before she became eligible for severance pay was preempted by the 
National Labor Relations Act. In the opinion of the court, resolution of her state claim 
necessarily “depended on” the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between AT 
&T and the Communications Workers of America, and thus the case was preempted by 
Section 301 of the Act.  The employee, who had worked 30 years with the company, 
claimed that prior to her retirement she asked the company if workforce reductions were 
planned. She was told no. But six weeks after she retired the company announced a large 
scale reduction and, had she still been employed at the time, she would have received 100 
weeks of severance pay.   
In finding preemption, the court agreed with the company that the issue of whether 
she was defrauded out of severance benefits was an issue arising from and governed by 
the bargaining agreement, and thus preempted by Section 301.  
In NLRB v. North Dakota, (D. ND, No. 1:06-cv-064m 2/1/07), a federal district court 
ruled that a North Dakota law that required union-represented employees to pay a 
representation fee to the union if they choose not to join was preempted by the NLRA. 
North Dakota is a right to work state and employees cannot be forced to join the union. 
The legislature believed that employees who do not voluntarily join should be forced to 
pay a fee to the union and not be a “free rider.” If a union processes a grievance for a 
non-member, then “that labor union shall collect the actual representation expenses from 
the nonunion employee.” (ND Century Code, Section 34-01-14.1. 
The NLRB filed an action requesting declaratory judgment that this law was 
preempted.  The Board further argued that such a fee would have a “coercive effect on 
non member employees in the exercise of their right not to join” a labor union. The Court 
agreed with the Board. It noted that the law conflicts with Section 7 of the Act, since 
employees are free to refrain from all union activity if they choose.  The effect of the 
legislation would be to “inject an agency fee requirement into every collective bargaining 
agreement written in this state.”  Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act makes it an unfair labor 
practice for a union to restrain or coerce an employee in the exercise of his or her Section 
                                                 
5 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85,91 (1983). 
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7 rights. By directing unions to collect fees from non-members, the Court noted, the law 
“requires unions to engage in conduct which is prohibited by the NLRA.”  
I. Disloyalty and Section 7 Rights 
A couple of cases from last year highlight the tension between reasonable employee 
loyalty to the organization and Section 7 concerted activity rights. 
 
In PHC-Elko Inc, 347 NLRB 143 (2006), the Board dealt with a case of an organizing 
effort at a hospital among its service and technical employees. During the campaign, the 
employer held some small group meetings with employees in which employer 
representatives argued that employees did not need a union. The COO, Rick Kilburn,  
then noted that there had been rumors about substandard care at the hospital and that all 
employees should serve as “ambassadors and marketers” for the hospital and that such an 
effort would result in better conditions at the hospital and better working conditions for 
the employees. One employee, Wanda Pollard, stated that she would rather resign than 
say anything positive about the hospital. She then related to the group how poorly her 
husband had been treated when he was a patient. In the ensuing discussion, Kilburn asked 
her why she worked for the hospital if she felt so strongly about this. 
 
Later in the conversation Kilburn was discussing the jail kitchen operation and 
whether it was profitable. Pollard said she didn’t want to work for the hospital; she 
wanted to work for the county. Kilburn said she would get her wish if the hospital did not 
retain its contract to operate the jail kitchen. 
 
When Kilburn was done, he turned the meeting over to the hospital’s chief financial 
operator who began a presentation on the hospital’s patient census. At that point, Pollard 
stood up and said “come on, girls, we’ve got to cook the food for the prisoners.” Kilburn 
told Pollard to sit down, that he had not closed the meeting. Pollard said she didn’t have 
to, it was a free country, and she reported to the county sheriff anyway.  After he ended 
the meeting, Kilburn told Pollard to stay after, at which point he fired her. In the follow 
up termination letter, Kilburn wrote: “During the mandatory employee meeting today, in 
front of several other employees, you consistently showed your nonsupport of working at 
Elko General Hospital and how you “want to go back to being county.” You also made 
comments about how you would not utilize Elko services due to a bad experience your 
husband had in the past, again showing no support for your employer. The last think you 
did was to dismiss the meeting yourself telling the employees that they all needed to get 
back to work.”  
 
The General Counsel of the NLRB contended that she was fired for concerted 
activity. The administrative law judge found that Elko had indeed fired her for concerted 
activity. He noted that when Kilburn asked the employees to be ambassadors for the 
hospital and linked it to improved working conditions if they did, then he established a 
term and condition of employment. When Pollard protested, she was in essence 
criticizing the terms of her employment and was thus engaging in protected activity.  
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While the judge found her conduct rude, he did not find it sufficient egregious to 
overcome the finding that she had been discharged for concerted activity.  
 
The Board correctly saw this as a mixed motive case.  The Board began its inquiry by 
assuming arguendo that Elko had in fact established a new term of employment as the 
ALJ suggested, and that Pollard was engaging in protected activity in protesting that new 
term.  The Board assumed arguendo that General Counsel met his burden of showing she 
was discharged for engaging in protected activity. 
 
The Board then turned to the other two reasons for the discharge and examine 
whether, under the Wright Line 6 analysis, the hospital would have fired her anyway. 
The two reasons were Pollard’s attempt to shut down the meeting and undermine 
Kilburn’s authority and that she advocated the demise of her own employer at the jail. 
She advocated that the county replace her employer in running the jail kitchen.  
 
Clearly, an employer need not tolerate the disloyal actions of an employee who 
wishes to oust her own employer from its position as employer. In sum, we find 
that Pollard was lawfully discharged when she insubordinately attempted to call 
to a halt the respondent’s meeting in direct defiance of the respondent’s officials 
and when she called for the ouster of the respondent as the employer of the jail 
kitchen employees. 
 
In Endicott Interconnect Technologies v. NLRB, 453 F. 3d 532 (D.C. Cir., 2006), 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a Board decision involving the discharge of 
employee for disloyal remarks to the press following the sale of a company and its 
purchase by EIT. White was quoted in the newspaper as saying “there’s gaping holes in 
this business,” and that, with the recent layoff of 200 employees, there were “voids in the 
critical knowledge base for this highly technical business.  White was called in to speak 
with one of the company’s owners who expressed displeasure over his reported 
statements. He threatened to terminate White if it happened again; White understood and 
said he was “on board.”   
 
However, a couple of weeks later, White posted a message on a website that the 
newspaper maintained as a public forum for comment on EIT’s acquisition of the local 
plant. Responding to an anti-union posting on the site, White wrote: 
 
To Mr. House: Why do you continue to try to bundle reasons why a union is 
suspect and not so desirable for EIT employees? Why do you site [sic] all the bad 
things about unions and ignore all the bad things IBM and EIT have done to the 
employees and their families and the community at large?..... This business is 
being tanked by a group of people that have no good ability to manage it. they 
will put it into the dirt just like the companies of the past that were “saved” by 
Tom Libous and George Pataki. ….The union is the beginning of a community 
standing up for itself. It’s time is now.  
                                                 
6 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980) enfd. 662 F. 2d 899 (1st Cir., 1981), approved in NLRB v. 
Transportation Management, 462 U.S. 393 (1983). 
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 The Board found that White’s comments were all protected and that his discharge 
violated the Act. 
 
 The Court first referenced NLRB v. Electrical Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346 
U.S. 464 (1953), where the Supreme Court articulated the standard for determining 
whether an employee’s actions are protected under section 7. The Court said that when an 
employee attacks his employer, whether or not he is engaged in concerted activity, the 
attack will deprive the employee of section 7 protection if it constitutes “insubordination, 
disobedience or disloyalty.” In subsequent cases, the Board formulated a two part test 
under which an employee’s communication to a third party is deemed protected under 
section 7 if, first, it is related to an ongoing labor dispute, and, second, it is “not so 
disloyal, reckless or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protection.” Am. Golkf Corp, 
330 NLRB 1238 ( 2000) (Mountain Shadows).  
 
 In this case, the Court believed the Board misapplied these standards. The Court 
noted that, in the first newspaper interview, “the damaging effects of the disloyal 
statements, made by an experienced insider at a time when EIT was struggling to get up 
and running under new management, is obvious from the immediate reaction of IBM’s 
vice president” who telephoned one of EIT’s owners because he was concerned about 
EIT’s ability to supply IBM’s circuit board needs.  But even after the company gave 
White a second chance, he immediately posted a message saying that the current 
management was causing the business to be “tanked” and that it was going “to put it into 
the dirt.”  The depth of this disloyalty under these conditions allowed the company to 
discharge White without running afoul of the NLRA.  
 
J. Bargainable topics 
 
In Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 
(Docket No. 101450, 101508, 101542, 101558, January 19, 2007), the Illinois 
Supreme Court ruled  that a union’s proposal on parking arrangements for 
personal vehicles was a mandatory subject of bargaining under the Illinois 
Educational Labor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1), (a)(5)). Using a three part 
analysis, the Court found that parking was, first of all, “an issue of wages, hours 
and terms and conditions of employment.” Second, that parking regulations were 
not a matter of “inherent managerial authority” residing at the “core of 
entrepreneurial control.” Third, since parking was not a matter of inherent 
managerial authority, the court did not need to reach the third part of the test, 
which would have been a balancing between the benefits that bargaining would 
have on the decisionmaking process with the burdens that bargaining would 
impose on the employer’s authority.”  
 
In Prof’l Staff Congress-CUNY v. NY State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 857 
N.E.2d 1108 (N.Y. 2006), the Professional Staff Congress (“PSC”), the certified 
collective bargaining representative of instructional and administrative employees of City 
University of New York (“CUNY”), argued that CUNY refused to  bargain over an 
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intellectual property policy.  In 1972, prior to the first CBA with PSC, CUNY adopted an 
intellectual property (“IP”) policy addressing ownership of copyrights and patents, the 
payment of royalties, and other issues related to intellectual property developed by 
CUNY employees.  The IP policy was never a subject of collective bargaining between 
PSC and CUNY, and was never incorporated into any of the CBAs.  When the parties 
began negotiating a new CBA, CUNY simultaneously began the process of amending its 
IP policy.  PSC demanded negotiation over the IP policy, but CUNY declined to 
negotiate it, asserting that Article 2 of the expired CBA, authorizing the CUNY Board of 
Trustees to alter existing bylaws or policies respecting a term or condition of employment 
not inconsistent with the CBA without PSC’s approval, constituted a waiver by the union 
of the right to negotiate particular items, including the IP policy.  CUNY argued that the 
Article 2 waiver remained in effect during negotiations for a successor agreement, and 
precluded the union from demanding that CUNY collectively bargain for modifications 
to the IP policy.  
 
PSC filed an improper practice charge with the State Public Employment 
Relations Board (“PERB”), claiming that CUNY’s refusal to negotiate modifications to 
the IP policy was an improper practice under Civil Service Law § 209-a(1)(d), requiring 
parties to negotiate in good faith.  The charge was not resolved at the time, because the 
parties reached agreement on a new CBA, and PSC withdrew its proposal concerning the 
IP policy along with all of its other outstanding bargaining demands.  Prior to the 
expiration of the new CBA, PSC demanded that the parties begin collective bargaining 
for the successor agreement by discussing the IP policy.  CUNY again asserted that 
Article 2 of the CBA constituted a waiver by the union of the right to collectively bargain 
changes to the IP policy.  CUNY subsequently adopted a new IP policy and PSC filed an 
amended improper practice charge reasserting the claim previously filed with PERB.  
After a hearing, an administrative law judge agreed with CUNY that the union waived its 
right to bargain over the IP policy in Article 2.  However, the ALJ also held that the 
waiver expired when the CBA expired, and therefore CUNY’s refusal to bargain for the 
policy after the expiration of the CBA was an improper practice.  Both parties appealed to 
PERB, which upheld the ALJ’s decision that PSC had waived the right to negotiate 
certain subjects, including the IP policy, under Article 2.  Unlike the ALJ, PERB held 
that the waiver remained in effect after the expiration of the CBA pursuant to the 
Triborough Amendment, which provides that all terms of an agreement are deemed to 
continue after the expiration of the CBA.  PSC challenged PERB’s ruling and the 
Appellate Division reversed, holding that CUNY had committed an improper practice 
when it refused to negotiate the IP policy.  The Appellate Division reasoned that 
bargaining waivers should not be interpreted to survive a CBA absent an express 
provision to that effect, and although employers are required to continue all the terms of 
an expired CBA, no reciprocal duty is imposed on employees.   
 
The Court of Appeals of New York first concluded that PERB reasonably 
interpreted Article 2 as a waiver by PSC of its right to demand negotiation concerning 
matters not addressed in the CBA, including the IP policy.  The court examined the 
language of Article 2, which specifically granted CUNY the right to make unilateral 
decisions concerning the alteration of bylaws, policies and resolutions concerning a term 
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or condition of employment.  Article 2 further provided that PSC’s consent to the Board’s 
action was not required prior to such action being taken or becoming effective, unless the 
action was inconsistent with a stated term of the CBA, and as long as PSC received 
notice and an opportunity to consult.  The court stated that the IP policy fell within the 
purview of Article 2 since it was never made part of the CBAs between PSC and CUNY 
and its alteration did not conflict with any term of the CBA.  Therefore, CUNY was not 
required under the CBA to obtain PSC’s consent to any change in the policy, nor was it 
obligated to negotiate modification of the policy with the union.   
 
Next, the court analyzed whether the Article 2 waiver remained in effect after the 
expiration of the CBA.  The court upheld PERB’s conclusion that the waiver did remain 
in effect based in part on Civil Service Law § 209-a(1)(e), requiring an employer to 
continue all the terms of an expired CBA while a new agreement is being negotiated, and 
PERB’s longstanding practice requiring employers to continue the terms and conditions 
of employment to maintain the status quo during collective bargaining for a new 
agreement.  PERB interpreted the law as imposing reciprocal obligations on both the 
employer and employee, and in cases in which members of a bargaining unit changed the 
status quo after expiration of a CBA, PERB concluded that the employer was free to do 
the same and could not be charged with an improper practice for altering the terms and 
conditions of employment.  Further, the court noted that the legislative history of the law 
indicates that it was intended to enhance the negotiating process by preserving the status 
quo until the parties can reach a new agreement and enacted into law what had become 
standard practice.  Thus, the practical effect of continuing all the terms of a CBA during 
the status quo period is that mutual obligations are imposed on both employers and 
employees, which is consistent with the statute and PERB’s long standing application of 
the Triborough doctrine.   
 
Finally, the court upheld PERB’s determination regarding CUNY’s negotiations 
in good faith.  In resolving PSC’s claim that CUNY failed to negotiate in good faith, 
PERB assessed whether CUNY was required to collectively bargain the intellectual 
property policy by reviewing the parties’ CBA, bargaining history, and past practices in 
light of established PERB precedent.  The court specifically rejected PSC’s assertion that 
a waiver provision should be deemed to expire at the conclusion of the CBA unless the 
parties include language indicating otherwise, as inconsistent with PERB precedent and 
Civil Service Law § 209-a(1)(e) because, under the statute, the assumption is that all 
terms of a CBA remain in effect during collective bargaining of a successor agreement.  
The court stated that a concern that this practice would result in a waiver in perpetuity 
was unfounded because the waiver itself was a mandatory subject of negotiation and the 
union was free to change or eliminate that language in the collective bargaining process.  
The court noted that because the Article 2 waiver was the subject of collective 
bargaining, it was not more likely than any other term of the parties’ CBA to continue in 
perpetuity.  In addition, the court noted that PERB has long held that parties can 
effectively prevent certain terms of a CBA from being continued after expiration of the 
contract by using language that causes the term to expire at the conclusion of the CBA or 
at some other point in time.  Here, PSC and CUNY knew how to include a sunset clause 
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in a contractual provision that they did not wish to carry into the status quo period as they 
had inserted such clauses into prior agreements.    
 
 
Also dealing with intellectual property is the case of Pittsburgh State 
Univ./Kansas Nat’l Educ. Assoc. v. Kansas Bd. of Regents/Pittsburgh State Univ. and 
Pub. Employee Relations Bd., 280 Kan. 408 (Kan. 2005). In 1997, the Kansas Board of 
Regents/Pittsburg State University (“KBR”) proposed a policy dictating that KBR 
retained ownership and control of any intellectual property created by faculty at Pittsburg 
State University (“PSU”).  The Pittsburg State University/Kansas National Education 
Association (“KNEA”), the recognized employee organization of certain PSU faculty, 
rejected this policy as unacceptable, proposed its own policy, and insisted that the parties 
negotiate the matter.  KBR responded by stating that it was not required under the Public 
Employer-Employee Relations Act (“PEERA”) to negotiate the policy because the 
subject of intellectual property rights was not a condition of employment, was preempted 
by federal and state law, and was a management prerogative.  KNEA filed a complaint 
with the Public Employee Relations Board (“PERB”), and while the complaint was 
pending, KBR formally adopted a different intellectual property policy giving some 
intellectual property rights to employees of KBR’s institutions, without meeting and 
conferring with KNEA.  KNEA amended its complaint to allege that KBR’s unilateral 
adoption of this policy was also a prohibited practice.  The essence of the complaint was 
that KBR had an obligation to meet and confer before adopting a policy regarding 
ownership of intellectual property.  
  
Under PEERA, KBR, a public employer, is required to meet and confer with 
KNEA, a recognized public employee organization, only if ownership of intellectual 
property is a condition of employment.  If the ownership of intellectual property is a 
condition of employment, the subject may be included in a memorandum of agreement if 
no exception applies, i.e., if ownership of intellectual property is not preempted by state 
or federal law, is not a right of a public employee, or is not a right of a public employer. 
 From the time KBR proposed the intellectual property policy and KNEA objected to it, 
KBR argued that ownership of intellectual property was not a condition of employment 
and that, even if it was, it could not be included as a subject in a memorandum of 
agreement because the subject was preempted by statute and fell within the rights of the 
public employer. As such, KBR asserted that it had no obligation to meet and confer with 
KNEA and, therefore, did not commit a prohibited practice when it implemented the 
policy. 
 
PERB determined that there was no obligation to meet and confer because federal 
and state law preempted the subject of intellectual property.  The PERB hearing officer 
assumed that the subject of intellectual property rights intimately and directly affected the 
work and welfare of the public employees at issue here, without deciding that question.  
He also declined to decide the application of the exception regarding the public 
employer’s rights, as he determined first that federal and state laws were preemptive. He 
focused solely on copyright law to find that the subject of intellectual property rights was 
preempted by operation of federal law, and found that state law mandated that any funds 
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received by a state educational institution or its employees from intellectual property be 
dedicated solely to the use of that institution.  He concluded that the disposition of funds 
received from intellectual property was statutory, and therefore not a mandatorily 
negotiable condition of employment.  PERB reviewed the decision and upheld the 
hearing officer’s initial order and decision.  The district court reversed PERB’s decision, 
concluding that intellectual property constitutes a condition of employment, and that the 
requirement to meet and confer on the subject of intellectual property did not violate 
Kansas law or in anyway impermissibly affect any inherent managerial policy. The court 
also opined that the subject was not preempted, noting that all intellectual property is not 
preempted by federal law and that the hearing officer relied solely upon copyright law, 
and concluded that KBR committed a prohibited practice when it refused to negotiate.  
The court of appeals reversed the district court and reinstated the decision of PERB, 
holding that requiring mandatory negotiations concerning intellectual property is 
preempted by federal copyright law.  
 
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Kansas first 
examined the Appeals court’s interpretation of the preemption exception.  The court 
stated that the issue was not whether federal legislation occupied the field to the 
exclusion of a state statute, as such an interpretation is inconsistent with the language and 
purpose of PEERA. Rather, the court stated, the appropriate inquiry was whether federal 
law prevented the parties from negotiating regarding ownership of intellectual property 
rights and entering into a memorandum of agreement which included that subject. If the 
freedom to contract remained, the subject of ownership of intellectual property rights was 
not preempted. The court examined copyright law and the work-for-hire doctrine which 
provides that “[t]he employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is 
considered the author . . . and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a 
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”  
The court held that the plain language of the statute reflects that Congress clearly 
contemplated that parties could negotiate ownership of a copyright, and allows the 
subject of copyright ownership to be covered within a memorandum of understanding or 
any other written agreement.  The court stated that at most, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) gave the 
bargaining power to KBR in those situations where the work-for-hire doctrine applied to 
ownership of a copyright, however, did not foreclose negotiation regarding ownership. 
The court determined that an employer is never required to “negotiate away rights” under 
PEERA, and rather than negotiating away rights, KBR and KNEA would be negotiating 
consistent with the parties’  expectations.  Although this could mean that KBR would 
maintain ownership rights, KBR could also determine that it does not always have 
ownership rights or is willing to contractually grant those rights to the faculty, as 17 
U.S.C. § 201(b) does not prevent the parties from entering into a memorandum of 
agreement regarding the subject of intellectual property rights. 
 
The court next held that the Appeals court, the hearing officer, and PERB erred in 
assuming that the work-for-hire doctrine would apply to any intellectual property created 
by PSU faculty simply because those faculty members were employees of PSU.  The 
court reasoned that while it was not clear that there is an absolute teacher exception to the 
work-for-hire doctrine as argued by KNEA, whether any particular creative work of a 
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faculty member constitutes work for hire depends on whether the work is the type of 
work the faculty member was hired to create; whether it was created substantially within 
the time and space limits of the job; and whether it was motivated by a purpose to serve 
the University employer, necessarily involving not just a case-by-case evaluation, but 
potentially a task-by-task evaluation.  
  
Further, in response to KNEA’s argument that the previous decisions in this case 
only addressed copyright and not other types of intellectual property,  the court held that, 
as with federal copyright law, federal law regarding patent ownership does not prevent 
the parties from entering into a memorandum of agreement regarding the subject of 
patent ownership. To the contrary, the Patent Act specifically provides that the parties 
may assign patent ownership rights. Thus, the court concluded that federal law did not 
preempt any kind of intellectual property rights from becoming the subject of a 
memorandum of agreement under PEERA. 
 
The court next held that PERB erroneously interpreted the law in concluding that, 
under state law, the disposition of funds received from intellectual property was fixed by 
state statute and was therefore not a condition of employment.  The court stated that  
state law only governs whether monies received for a particular state education institution 
are dedicated to that specific educational institution, and does not govern whether monies 
received by an educational institution’s employees for the sale of intellectual property 
belong to the educational institution or the employee.  As such, the court concluded that 
neither state nor federal law preempted the subject of ownership of intellectual property 
from being the subject of negotiations between a public employer and a recognized 
public employee organization or being included within the scope of a memorandum of 
understanding.  
 
The court next addressed whether intellectual property rights were a condition of 
employment under PEERA.  The court stated that the district court was authorized to 
determine whether PERB had erroneously interpreted and applied the law to the facts of 
the case.  The court noted that the hearing officer did not make all findings regarding 
facts about conditions of employment and failed to balance whether an item is 
significantly related to an express condition of employment, and whether negotiating the 
item would not unduly interfere with management rights reserved to the employer by law, 
to determine if the item is mandatorily negotiable.  According to the court, the district 
court should have remanded the case to PERB for additional findings regarding whether 
ownership of intellectual property is a condition of employment and whether the 
exception of public employer rights in PEERA applied.  As a result, the court remanded 
this issue to PERB for further proceedings. 
 
 
II. Arbitration 
 
In Luzerne County Commissioners College, 2007 WL 79233 (Pa. Comm., 1/4/07), a 
commonwealth court in Pennsylvania found that an arbitrator did not exceed his authority 
by awarding a promotion to a faculty member when the college failed to answer his 
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grievance over the denial in a timely fashion. The collective bargaining agreement in play 
had a provision in the Grievance Article that read: “If a grievance is not responded to by 
the President or his/her designee within the time frame prescribed in this Section, then 
said grievance will be deemed resolved in favor or the grievance and/or the Association.” 
Under the contract, the President had ten working days following the receipt of the 
written grievance to file his or her answer. In this case, the assistant professor who was 
denied promotion grieved under the CBA. He met with the President of the College, 
along with his union representative, to discuss the grievance. A written response was due 
by September 9, 2004. When the union did not hear from the President by September 15, 
it contacted the President and told her that the union considered the matter resolved in the 
grievant’s favor and that they expected an official letter notifying him of promotion.  
 
 The arbitrator ruled in favor of the union, noting that the language of the contract 
was clear and unambiguous and that since no answer was filed by the President, the union 
wins.  On appeal, the college argued that since the president had discussed the matter 
with the union earlier, there was no need for a formal answer. The arbitrator had 
disagreed in light of the clear language of the contract and the court upheld his 
interpretation. The college also argued that the arbitrator had no authority to grant 
promotion and only the trustees could do that. However, since the promotion procedure is 
within the four corners of the CBA, an arbitrator would have authority to grant 
promotion. Moreover, since the Board of Trustees had signed the CBA, including the 
language about automatic resolution of the grievance in the union’s favor if a timely 
answer is not filed, the Board itself had recognized that promotion might be granted in a 
case like this as a remedy by an arbitrator.  
 
In Slippery Rock University v. Ass’n of Penn. State College and University 
Faculties, 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 12, 181 L.R.R.M. 2377 (Pa. Commw. Ct. January 
16, 2007), the Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties 
(“APSCUF”) was signatory to a contract with the State System of Higher Education 
(“SSHE”), of which Slippery Rock University (“the University”) is a part. The CBA 
allowed limited grievance rights to a faculty member who had been denied tenure.  Under 
the CBA, the decision to grant tenure was to be based on a faculty member’s performance 
in three areas: teaching effectiveness; scholarly growth; and service to the University and 
community.  The University had a policy with the local APSCUF chapter providing that 
if there was a conflict between the Local Agreement and the CBA, the CBA would apply. 
The Local Agreement stated that the tenure candidate must assume the burden of 
providing substantial evidence that the departmental performance review categories have 
been met, that it is the University president’s ultimate responsibility for the tenure 
process, and that the president must ensure that all judgments are sustained by sufficient 
and appropriate evidence.  The president also must not employ criteria other than those 
used by the departmental and University-wide tenure committees.   
  
The Grievant became employed as an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at 
the University in 1999.  As a probationary faculty member, Grievant’s performance was 
evaluated annually, pursuant to the terms of the CBA.  According to the annual 
evaluations, Grievant’s efforts to engage in scholarly growth were considered adequate 
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by some University evaluators but lacking by others.  When Grievant became eligible for 
the tenure application process, she submitted an application for tenure which included an 
enumerated list of seven scholarly growth activities.  The Chairperson of the Computer 
Science Department and the Departmental Committee both recommended the Grievant 
for tenure, and noted her accomplishments in the area of scholarly growth.  The 
University-wide Tenure and Sabbatical Committee (UTSC) reviewed the 
recommendations of the Chairperson and the Departmental Committee, as well as the 
annual evaluations from the Grievant’s first four years of employment at the University.  
Despite the recommendations for tenure by the Chairperson and Departmental 
Committee, the UTSC voted to recommend the denial of Grievant’s application for 
tenure based on inadequate scholarly growth.  The Provost reviewed the tenure 
application and the recommendations, and as a result of the conflicting recommendations, 
contacted the Dean of the College and another professor in the Computer Science 
Department in order to get more information about the Grievant.  The Provost also met 
with Grievant and permitted her to provide additional information about her scholarly 
endeavors.  Ultimately, the Provost recommended to the University president that 
Grievant be denied tenure, and the president denied Grievant’s tenure accordingly.   
  
As a result, APSCUF field a grievance on Grievant’s behalf pursuant to the CBA.  
The grievance was denied at all levels, and an arbitration hearing was held.  The 
Arbitrator determined that the president violated the terms of the CBA and ordered that 
Grievant be reinstated and deemed eligible for reconsideration for tenure.  Subsequently, 
the University filed a petition with the court challenging the award of the Arbitrator.  The 
University asserted that the Arbitrator’s award failed to draw its essence from the CBA, 
and that the Arbitrator applied the incorrect burden of proof and used his own criteria to 
evaluate Grievant’s tenure application rather than the criteria that was bargained for and 
agreed to by the parties.  Although both parties agree that the CBA did not expressly state 
which party bore the burden of proof in a grievance procedure involving tenure, the 
University argued that the Arbitrator violated the essence test when he applied the 
incorrect burden of proof, misapplied precedent, and that the language of the CBA could 
not be rationally interpreted to allow for the burden of proof applied by the Arbitrator. 
  
In reaching a decision, the Arbitrator reviewed several arbitration cases to 
determine the appropriate analysis to apply in the absence of a specified standard or 
burden of proof in the CBA. The Arbitrator relied upon two previous arbitration decisions 
concerning the denial of tenure of faculty members at other universities in the SSHE 
system.   The University argued that according to the first arbitration decision relied 
upon, the standard applicable to a denial of tenure case is whether the Arbitrator finds 
that the University acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious.  Further, the 
framework established in the second decision is essentially a just cause standard because 
it required the University to first establish a sound, reasonable basis for the decision 
denying tenure and then required Grievant to establish why that decision should be 
disturbed. APSCUF disagreed with the University’s assertion that the Arbitrator applied a 
just cause standard of review, arguing that the Arbitrator merely accepted the framework 
established in the second decision relied upon. APSCUF further contended that the 
Arbitrator applied the framework and concluded, after reviewing Grievant’s work history 
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and scholarly growth, that there was no basis for the UTSC’s finding that Grievant lacked 
responsiveness to areas of improvement that had been suggested to her, and that the 
President’s description of Grievant’s scholarly growth as lacking was contrary to the 
record.  Based upon those findings, he concluded that the University failed to meet its 
burden of establishing a sound, reasonable basis for denying tenure to Grievant.  Because 
the University failed to carry the burden, the Arbitrator held that no further inquiry was 
required. APSCUF averred that this did not mean that the Arbitrator applied a just cause 
standard, rather that the University failed to satisfy the first part of the two-part test. 
 
The court vacated the award and remanded the case to the Arbitrator for further 
proceedings consistent with its opinion.  The court stated that the analysis applied by the 
Arbitrator in this case was not rationally derived from the CBA, and therefore, the 
decision failed to meet the requirements of the essence test.  The court reasoned that the 
CBA was silent as to the burden of proof and the standard of review to be applied in 
denial of tenure cases.  However, the Local Agreement, executed by the University and 
the local APSCUF unit, set forth the burden of proof when a candidate applied to the 
University for tenure, providing that the tenure candidate must assume the burden of 
providing substantial evidence that the departmental performance review categories have 
been met.  Further, the Local Agreement provided that if there was a conflict between it 
and the CBA, the CBA was controlling.  The court stated that no conflict existed, as the 
Local Agreement merely provided a burden of proof where the CBA was silent, and the 
Arbitrator should have looked to the Local Agreement to supplement the terms of the 
CBA. Therefore, pursuant to the Local Agreement, in a proceeding to challenge the 
denial of tenure, Grievant bore the burden to establish that there was substantial evidence 
that she met the departmental performance review categories for tenure. The court 
concluded that in light of the Local Agreement and the CBA, the Arbitrator wrongly 
placed the burden of proof on the University to establish that it had reasonable and sound 
basis for denying tenure. 
 
III.   Shirts and Free Speech 
 
Two interesting cases arose last year on employees wearing shirts and their 
connection to free speech. The first case is  Montle v. Westwood Heights School District, 
(E.D. Mich., No. 05-10137, 6/15/06). In this case, a federal judge determined that a high 
school teacher who wore a pro-union shirt into the class room was not engaged in 
protected expression under the First Amendment.  Montle, a probationary teacher, and 
other teachers, wore bright green T-shirts with the initials of the union on the front, and 
the slogan “Working without a Contract,” emblazoned on the back. When his four year 
probationary term ended, the school district refused to renew his contract and grant him 
tenure. He sued, claiming that the decision was in retaliation for his exercising his First 
Amendment rights. 
 
The Court cited the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct, 
1951 (2006) and observed that the Court had noted that a government entity has greater 
freedom to restrict free speech when it is acting in its role as an employer, “but the 
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restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the 
entity’s operations.” 
 
While the Court agreed that in this case, Montle’s “speech” touched a matter of 
public concern, it found that the interest of the employee did not outweigh the employer’s 
interest in promoting the efficiency of its public service. Montle had upbraided his co 
workers who did not wear the shirt and his confrontational behavior prompted complaints 
to the principal by other teachers. Under those circumstances, the teacher’s right to free 
speech was outweighed by the school’s “interest in ensuring professional demeanor and 
good relations among its faculty.”  
 
In the second case, the Sixth Circuit rejected the claims of three Kentucky parks 
employees who were fired for refusing the tuck in their shirts as required by a new dress 
code. The court found that their untucked shirts did not amount to speech on a matter of 
public concern; that the revision of the dress code without prior notice did not violate 
their right to due process; and that the new policy’s disparate impact on manual laborers 
did not violated their right to equal protection. 
 
The new policy stated that all parks employees who have contact with the public are 
required to “maintain a professional, business like appearance,” and also prohibited 
visible tattoos and body piercings that are offensive or not consistent with the mission of 
the department. In an interpretative memo, the parks director sent an email to managers 
spelling out more specific standards, including a flat prohibition on body piercing, except 
for earrings; all visible tattoos and required the tucking in of all blouses and shirts.  The 
day after this was issued, the department discharged three workers who refused to tuck in 
their shirts. Another employee was fired for not covering his tattoo that said “USN” – he 
had previously served in the Navy. 
 
While the judge found no matter of public concern on the question of tucking in your 
shirt, he thought the tattoo issue was a bit closer because it arguably expressed his 
support for the U.S. Navy. But the employee’s refusal to tuck in his shirt provided the 
parks department with an independent reason for termination anyway. Roberts v. Ward, 
No. 05-6305, 6th Cir., 2006). 
 
IV. Legislation – H. 800 and related matters 
 
On March 1, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.800, a bill that, among 
other things, would allow a union to become certified without an election by having an 
NLRB card check procedure instead. A union that was able to produce signed 
authorization cards from a majority of those workers in an appropriate unit could file a 
petition with the Board and become certified after an NLRB check of the cards. IN 
addition, the legislation would require binding arbitration for first contract negotiations if 
the parties failed to reach an agreement within 90 days of the union being certified and 
following a 30 day attempt at mediation. The results of arbitration would be binding on 
the parties for two years.  The House vote was 241-185. 
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On March 30, 2007, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) filed legislation (S. 1041) that 
would give workers the right to form a union through the same card check procedure.  
This bill is identical to the House bill. The measure had 46 co-sponsors, well short of the 
60 needed to end an anticipated Republican filibuster of the bill. In sponsoring the bill, 
Senator Kennedy said that “Unscrupulous employers routinely break the law to keep 
unions out – they intimidate employees, harass them, and discriminate against them. 
They shut down whole departments –even entire plants- to avoid negotiating a union 
contract. It’s illegal and unacceptable.”  
 
In contrast, Senator Michael Enzi (R-Wyo) said he opposed the bill as it would take 
away workers’ free speech and the right to a secret ballot election. “This proposal is a 
shameless attempt to rob workers of their most fundamental right – the right to a private 
ballot – in order to bolster declining union membership.” The measure would open 
employees to pressure, intimidation, and coercion by co-workers and labor union leaders.  
 
While union advocates point out that many elections are delayed due to management 
“stalling” tactics, the NLRB General Counsel’s Report on FY 06 operations for the Board 
showed that initial elections in union representation cases were conducted in a median of 
only 39 days from the filing of the petition, with 94.2% of all elections conducted within 
56 days. (3643 representation cases total). Over 91% of those were conducted by 
agreement of the parties. 
 
Similar initiatives have been undertaken at the state level as well in allowing public 
employee unions to be certified without an election, and seven states currently allow for 
some or all of its public employees to be unionized without an election.7 
 
Perhaps even more consequential in the federal bill is the provision calling for 
binding arbitration in first contract situations. If the parties do not reach an agreement on  
a first contract within 90 days of a request to  bargain, either party can call in the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service. If FMCS fails to resolve the dispute within 30 days, 
it will appoint an arbitrator who will issue a binding decision as to the disputed issues of 
the contract. Such decision would be binding for two years on both parties, unless 
extended by agreement. 
 
The fundamental principle of labor law since the 1930s is that the parties should be 
free to bargain in the arena of free enterprise without third parties mandated the 
provisions of any collective bargaining agreement. The pending legislation would force 
agreements through third party decision in the critical first collective bargaining 
agreement situations if settlement isn’t reached in a very short period of time. 
 
                                                 
7 The seven card check majority states are Connecticut, Kansas (Teachers only), Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Jersey, Oklahoma (Municipal Employees only) and Washington. A similar bill is pending in the Vermont 
legislature. .Many other states allow voluntary recognition by an employer but in these seven states, a union 
can insist on such recognition even if management wants a secret ballot election for the employees. A 
similar bill is pending in the Vermont legislature. 
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 Finally, the bill would increase penalties on employers who engage in 
discriminatory or coercive conduct during a union organizational campaign, or while the 
first contract is being negotiated. An employee could receive treble damages in back pay 
situations, as well as management paying up to a $20,000 civil penalty for each violation. 
 
 
V.  Same Sex Marriage and Related Matters 
 
So far, there is still but one state that recognizes same sex marriages. In 2003, the 
decision Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003) was issued where 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the benefits, obligations and 
responsibilities of civil marriage must also apply to same sex couples. The Court thus 
found that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts violated the Massachusetts Constitution 
when it refused to grant marriage licenses to same sex couples. Since May 17, 2004, 
same sex couples can lawfully marry in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and since 
then some 6500 couples have been married in the state. 
  
 At the present time, over half the states have amended their constitutions to bar 
same sex marriages, and there are legislative and/or ballot initiatives in 11 other states 
seeking to put constitutional gay marriage bans on the ballot in 2008, including 
Massachusetts.  On the other hand, there are pending bills in California, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington to 
legalize gay marriage.  Civil union or domestic partnership bills are pending in nine 
states. 
 
Over the past year there has been some further litigation in the state courts on 
same sex marriage and decisions are pending in some states.8 A few recent cases 
involving the question of same sex marriage include: 
 
 
NEW JERSEY:  Lewis v. Harris 
 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the legislature must provide full rights 
and responsibilities to gay couples as heterosexual couples, either via civil unions or 
marriage.  The court ruled that same-sex couples and their families have a constitutional 
right to the same benefits and protections that other New Jersey families take for granted.  
It ordered New Jersey’s Legislature to provide these benefits and protections to same-sex 
couples. The Legislature can do this by amending its marriage laws to include same-sex 
couples, or it could enact a system, such as one that provides for civil unions, to extend 
equal benefits to same-sex couples. New Jersey already has a domestic partner law that 
provides certain protections to couples. The court gave the Legislature 180 days to adopt 
the necessary legislation. 
                                                 
8 The gay rights organization Lambda Legal has an excellent summary of national activity in this area on 
their web site. www.lambdalegal.org. 
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In its ruling the Court said: 
In light of plaintiffs’ strong interest in rights and benefits comparable to those of 
married couples, the State has failed to show a public need for disparate 
treatment. We conclude that denying to committed same-sex couples the financial 
and social benefits and privileges given to their 57 married heterosexual 
counterparts bears no substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental 
purpose. 
We are mindful that in the cultural clash over same-sex marriage, the word 
marriage itself -- independent of the rights and benefits of marriage -- has an 
evocative and important meaning to both parties. Under our equal protection 
jurisprudence, however, plaintiffs' claimed right to the name of marriage is surely 
not the same now that equal rights and benefits must be conferred on committed 
same- sex couples. 
Our decision today significantly advances the civil rights of gays and lesbians. 
We have decided that our State Constitution guarantees that every statutory right 
and benefit conferred to heterosexual couples through civil marriage must be 
made available to committed same-sex couples. Now the Legislature must 
determine whether to alter the long accepted definition of marriage. 
Subsequently, the New Jersey Legislature passed a civil union law to comply with this 
ruling. As such, New Jersey followed the same process as Vermont, which also 
established civil unions a number of years ago in response to a state Supreme Court 
ruling.  
 
WASHINGTON:  Andersen v. Sims   Upheld the state’s exclusion of same sex 
marriages. The ruling, a 5-4 decision that upheld the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 
was handed down on July 26, 2006. The majority ruled that the DOMA does not violate 
the state's constitution and that the will of the legislature or the people through a ballot 
initiative measure process could revoke the controversial law. 
In the plurality opinion, the Court wrote: 
Limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers procreation, essential to the 
survival of the human race, and furthers the well-being of children by 
encouraging families where children are reared in homes headed by the children’s 
biological parents. 
NEW YORK:  Hernandez v. Robles.  Decided in July 2006, the decision upheld the 
state’s exclusion of same sex couples from marriage. As with the Washington court, the 
decision emphasized that only the legislature could extend marital privileges to same sex 
couples. 
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NEBRASKA: Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc.  et al v. Governor Michael O. Johanns 
et al.  Decided in July 2006 by the U.S. Circuit Court for the Eighth Circuit, essentially 
upheld the state’s constitutional amendment that bans all relationship recognition-type 
protections for same sex couple. 
CALIFORNIA:  Woo v. Lockyear . In December 2006, the state high court agreed to 
hear an appeal of the case asking that same sex couples be allowed to marry. Case argued 
during the past couple of weeks. Note: currently California grants full in-state marital 
benefits by allowing same sex couples to register as domestic partners. 
IOWA: Varnum v. Brien.  Trial date set for July 2007 on whether same sex couples can 
marry in Iowa.  
CONNECTICUT: Kerrigan v. State of Connecticut. On appeal to high court on whether 
same sex couples can marry in Connecticut.  
MARYLAND: Conaway v. Deane and Polyak. On appeal to high court on whether same 
sex couples can marry in Maryland. 
 MASSACHUSETTS: Cote-Whitacre et al v. Dept Public Health. 
 On September 29, 2006, Massachusetts Superior Court Justice Thomas Connolly 
rules that there is no explicit prohibition in Rhode Island law preventing same sex 
couples from marrying, and therefore Rhode Island same sex couples were free to come 
to Massachusetts to marry.  On the other hand, since New York had specifically ruled 
against same sex marriage, New York same sex couples could not be married in 
Massachusetts. 
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